Cahier d'études sur la Méditerranée
orientale et le monde turco-iranien
n°18, juillet-décembre 1994
RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG THE BALKAN MUSLIMS : A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON GREECE, BULGARIA,MACEDONIA AND KOSOVO
Prof. dr. Baskin ORAN
Today two intermingled concepts haunt the Balkans: religion and
nationalism. I will first attempt a theoretical approach to these two concepts.
In the context of the history of western Europe, nationalism is a
cohesion ideology that chronologically came after the religion and therefore
fought it to take its place. Unlike the ideology of religion with corresponded to
Feudalism with "God" as its focus of societal loyalty, the ideology of
nationalism corresponded to Capitalism with "nation" at this focus. The
antagonism was obvious indeed and the French Revolution of 1789 confiscated
the church property, Napoléon subdued the Church to the state and anticlerical
laws in France followed one another well until the beginning of the 20th
century.
Interestingly, the Kemalist nationalism that followed the Western and,
in particular, the French model reduced orthodox Islam (i.e., organized official
religion) to the level of a "general directorate" of the government machinery
and closed and banned the institutions of heterodox Islam (i.e. religion as
understood and practiced by the people) such as tekkes and zaviyes. Moreover,
Kemalist nationalism fought this war against religion in a social medium
incomparably less convenient than the one in 1789 both in terms of mode of
production and people's loyalty to religion.
However, in contrast to this basic historical conflict between religion
and nationalism, one can detect a number of cases in which religion and
nationalism marry, religion supporting nationalism or the national identity at
least. The main ones can be cited as follows :
1. When there is a third cohesion ideology that threatens both (e.g.,
Marxism);
2. In case of the existence of the "Chosen People" concept, as in the
case of Jews and even Arabs;
This paper was presented to the conference jointly organized by CERI of Paris and
Political Science Faculty of Ankara on "Turkish Areas in the New Regional and
International Configuration", Ankara, 2-3 November 1992.
3. When the elements making a nation (language, national market, etc.)
are weak, in which case religion plays the role of social paste to make up for
them;
4. Emergency situations like war;
5. When there is a "National Church";
6. In cases where the religion of the dominant nation is different than
that of the dominated one, the religion of the latter supports its nationalism or
its national identity at least.
This last case is the one I'll try to discuss here in the context of Balkans
today.
I said "today" but one must begin by noting that this phenomenon is
nothing new. On the contrary, it was very common in the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman "millet" system assigned legal personality to non-Muslim
minorities in a manner unknown even today. In this system, the heads of millets
had the authority to rule their communities, to represent them at the Royal
Court, and to collect taxes.
In the beginning of 19th century, the Balkan bourgeoisies became
strong enough to attempt to draw their own territorial boundaries. When the
ideas of the French Revolution reached the area at this period, this class had
already had a strong trump-card : The Orthodox Churches. The "national"
Orthodox churches had maintained their power during the Ottoman period
thanks to the role assigned to them in the millet system and became number one
supporter of the nationalist movements that began under foreign, especially
Russian influence. This was how all the Balkan peoples won their autonomy or
independence from the Ottoman Empire between 1820 and 1878.
After this theoretical introduction, I should note some striking examples
of the interaction between religion and nationalism in the era of Ottoman
Empire before I proceed to discuss contemporary developments :
1. Russia which in practice was the most influential country in this
independence process was Orthodox as most of the Balkan peoples.
2. Albanians, who won their independence as late as 1912 although they
were known for their nationalistic behavior, were Muslims like the Ottomans.
3. The Bosnians, who were "more Turkish than the Turks" and who
wanted to take up the arms against the "infidels" when Greeks revolted in
18211, were also Muslims. There had never been a nationalist movement in
Bosnia against the Ottomans.
4. To cite an example from the eastern part of the Empire: The
Armenian people was called by the Ottomans "Millet-i Sadika" (The Loyal
Community) since they caused no problem whatsoever until the nationalist
groups in eastern Anatolia took up the arms as late as in 1894 and under
Russian influence. These nationalist groups were solely Gregorian, i.e.,
Orthodox. Armenians who were Catholic or Protestant did not develop any
nationalism, nor did they fight against the Ottomans in the ranks of Russian
army in the First World War. It is also interesting to remember that Catholic or
Protestant Armenians were not included in the 1915 deportation ordered by the
Young Turk government.
After this brief glance at this intermingled relationship between religion
(and even, sect) and nationalism in the history of the Balkans, we can now
discuss the situation today.
1 Georges Castellan, Histoire des Balkans , XIV-XXe siècle, Paris, Fayard, 1991, p.
316
GREECE
The only sizable minority of Greece lives in Western Thrace, close to
the Turkish border. I will not discuss the conflicts between Greece and Turkey
about this minority. However, I would like to underline that while Greece calls
it "Muslim minority", Turkey identifies it as "Turkish minority". Before going
into any sociological considerations, I must point out that both countries are
legally right :
1. Greece is right, because Article 45 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of
24 July 1923 protecting the rights of this minority identifies it as "Muslim
Minority". (In this treaty, "Non-Muslim" is the term used to identify those
minorities to be protected in Turkey.) It is also a fact that the minority is not
solely made up of Turks only.
2. Turkey is right, because the Convention and Protocol on the
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations of 30 January 1923 that regulated
the compulsory exchange of the said minorities in these two countries and
allowed the existence of respective minorities in Istanbul and Western Thrace
(établis), makes mention of "Turks" and not of "Muslims". Moreover, the
official établi documents in French delivered at the period identify the Istanbul
minority as "Greek" and the Western Thrace minority as "Turk", a term also
used by all Greek governments until the coup d'Etat of 1967 in this country.
The most difficult cases are those where everybody is right. Therefore,
we better leave discussing the legal situation and proceed to study this identity
problem sociologically. I will first throw an eye on the ethnic composition of
the Western Thrace minority and then study how the non-Turkish members of
this minority identify themselves.
The ethnic composition of the minority seems to support the official
claims of Greece. Among approximately 120,000 Muslims some 30.000 are
Pomak, some 5000 are Gypsy, the rest being Turkish.
Pomaks are considered to be of Bulgarian descent by Bulgaria, of Greek
descent by Greece, and of Turkish descent by Turkey. Dutch scientist Fred de
Jong, well known for his works on Western Thrace, identifies the Pomaks as
"...a people whose ethnic origins are not known precisely; they usually speak a
dialect of Bulgarian language, and Turkish as a second language; they are a
Turkified Muslim people"2.
Pomaks are devout Muslims; they live in mountainous regions and learn
Turkish as they go to school and establish contacts with the Turks. Gypsies are
also Muslim.
2 Fred de Jong, "The Muslim Minority in Western Thrace", in Georgina Ashworth
(ed.), Muslim Minorities in the Eighties, Sunbury, Quartermaine House Ltd., 1980, p.95
As for the question of self-identification among the minority, the Turks
have always aimed at living as "Greek citizens of Turkish descent and of
Muslim religion" on their lands and did not develop so far any nationalistic
claims so far, such as annexation of Western Thrace to Turkey. One reason for
this is that Greece is economically a better place than the other side of the
frontier. On the other hand, they very strongly emphasize their Turkish identity
as shown in their dresses, various associations, clubs, and political parties, and
in many other ways. To make any concession whatsoever in this matter seems
to be out of question for them.
This situation is very natural for a number of reasons. The Turks had
outnumbered the total of all other nationalities in the region when Western
Thrace was left to Greece in 1920; the region is at the Turkish border; it has not
been long since it was separated from Turkey; this community is Muslim, i.e.,
the "millet-i hakime" (sovereign nationality) in the Ottoman system while
Greeks are Christians, i.e., the "millet-i muhakkime" (dominated nationality);
ever since the beginning of this identity argument between the minority and
Greek officials in early 70s the müftis (who have always had temporal powers
also in the semi-theocratic Greece) are no more religious leaders only but
national symbols as well.
It is normal that Turks identify themselves as Turks, but what is
interesting is the fact that the non-Turkish members of the minority, Pomaks
and Gypsies, identify themselves even more strongly as Turks, as shown by my
research in the region3 :
1. Education : Pomaks are very sensitive on the issue of education in
Turkish. Although they speak Pomak language at home, it is very important for
them that their children attend Turkish minority schools. Since early 1970's,
Greek authorities have given scholarships to Pomak youngsters who cannot find
jobs in their hometowns to go and study at the Saloniki Academy of Pedagogy
(founded in 1966). The Pomak teachers educated there are appointed to the
minority schools in their hometowns and they are required to teach in Greek.
The parents do not allow their children to attend such schools that close down
because of the boycotts. The Pomak minority has severely reacted against this
policy. For instance, in 1972, the Pomak women of the village of Galini
(Yalanca) attacked the gendarmes who put down the signboard of the village
school reading "Turkish Minority School" and who replaced it with the one
reading "Muslim Minority School". These boycotts continued intermittently
throughout the 1980s and 90s, and even at the time of my translating this article
into English (April 1994).
3 For further information on the Muslim minority in Greece, see Baskin Oran, Türk-
Yunan Iliskilerinde Bati Trakya Sorunu (The Western Thrace Question in Turco-Greek
Relations), 2nd ed., Ankara, Bilgi Yayinevi, 1991.
2. Minority organization : After a long struggle since 1972, the three
main organizations of the minority were banned by the court in 1987, on the
grounds that they maintained the word "Turkish" in their names, while "they
were not Turkish". At the following mass demonstrations on 29 January 1988
largest participation came from the Pomaks living in the northern mountainous
region. It might be instructive to note that Mustafa Hilmi Effendi (1901-1990),
the mufti of Xanthy (Turkish name: Iskeçe) who became the symbol of this
minority's struggle for identity, was a Pomak who could not speak Turkish
fluently.
Gypsies, on the other hand, are even more radical than Pomaks in this
matter. Indeed, when a false news broadcast by a Greek local radio resulted in
an attack of fanatic Greek groups against the minority on 29 January 1990, the
worst fights took place in Kalkanca, the Gypsy quarter of Komotini (Turkish
name: Gümülcüne).
3. Self-Identification : To call a Gypsy "Gypsy" is taken as an insult in
Western Thrace. What is more interesting is that Pomaks also take it as an insult
when they are called "Pomak". Since the Ottoman times this people have
always considered Muslim consciousness and Turkish consciousness identical,
they identified themselves as "Turkish," and wanted to be called as such.
There is more than one reason for this interesting situation :
1. In cases where a rigid and repressive ideology is unable to satisfy the
basic needs of people, the continual ideological bombardment may result in
strong reaction. This reaction may vary from ideological apathy to active
rejection of the ideas that the ideology intends to inject. It may also hasten the
drive for opposite ideologies. This is the situation experienced in Turkey by
Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin.
This mechanism of "the negative function of ideology" is also the case
for Pomaks (and also Gypsies) in Western Thrace. These people live in
conditions of poverty in mountainous regions and the Greek State discriminates
against them4.
4 To illustrate some aspects of this discrimination, two Greek laws may be brought to
attention. Firstly, as a result of the application of the Greek law numbered 1366/1938
(this law was condemned by the European Community Court of Justice on 30 May
1989, case no.309/87), members of the Muslim minority in Greece cannot acquire
immovable property in Western Thrace. A surprisingly low number of Greeks, except
those living in Western Thrace, are aware of this situation. Secondly, Art. 19 of the
Greek Citizenship Law (no.3370/1938) stipulates that "When a person of non-Greek
ethnic origin" goes abroad "without the intention of returning, this person may be
removed from Greek citizenship" by administrative decree, as a result of which
thousands of Western Thracians have lost their citizenship. The US State Department,
on its 1990 Human Rights Report-Greece has had this to say about Art.19!: "(In Greece)
In such conditions, the Greek State propagandizes that Pomaks are
"forcefully converted grandsons of Alexander the Great"5, Greek academicians
interpret the Pomak traditions of cutting the round bread into four pieces and of
putting cross-shaped iron bars to windows as reminiscent of their Christian
times. Furthermore, some scientists make tests to prove that Pomaks carry
Greek and not Turkish blood6.
As a result of all this, Turkish consciousness among the Pomaks
becomes stronger. Indeed, during my interviews with them in Western Thrace
in 1985, Pomaks had this to say about being former Christians :"If it's the
Ottomans who forcefully converted us to Islam, may them rest in holy peace (in
Turkish : Nur içinde yatsinlar); but otherwise if we became Muslims
voluntarily, we are proud of ourselves! (in Turkish : Aferin bize)".
2. Unlike the Turks in Western Thrace, Pomaks and Gypsies do not
have a kin-state who defends the internationally guaranteed rights of the
Muslim minority and Turkey does it for all of them.
3. Numerically, Turks make up the main element of the minority and
are much better off economically. They also have, as the ruling ethnic group in
the Ottoman Empire, a more brilliant past in terms of language, culture and
history. Therefore, the Turkish identity definitely represents an element of
prestige, and even of upward mobility among the minority.
4. In such a setting, the Greek policy of identifying the minority as
"Muslim", instead of "Turkish," results in abolishing any possible trace identity
differences between Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies. From this point that appears
to be the basic problem of Greek authorities, we can go back to our main
subject matter :
The fundamental reason why Pomaks identify themselves as Turkish is
the fact that this oppressed minority is Muslim while the oppressing majority is
exile is unconstitutional and does not occur, except in the form of an administrative
decree on the loss of citizenship by non-ethnic Greeks" (pp.18-20). For numerous other
cases of Greek discriminatory policy, see ibid., pp. 113-276.
5 It seems that this theme of "Alexander the Great" has been abandoned by Greek
official ideology since Macedonia became an independent state in 1991.
6 See Dr. N.I. Xirotiri, Findings on the Classification of the Frequency of Blood Groups
Among Pomaks, Ph.D. Thesis in Greek, Thessaloniki, 1971, in Pavlos Hidiroglou,
Hellenic Pomaks and their Relations with Turkey (in Greek), 2nd ed., Athens, Hrodotos
Publications, 1989, p. 15-16 (I am grateful to my ex-student Mr. Halim Çavusoglu for
bringing those publications to my attention and translating the relevant sections for me).
Orthodox Christian. The other reasons are only secondary. As suggested at the
beginning of this paper, the religion of the oppressed minority supports its
"national" identity, and even becomes identified with the latter when the
oppressing majority is of a different religion. Of course, this situation here is all
the more accentuated by :
a) The historical hostility between the Turks and the Greeks. As
Hercules Millas, a member of Istanbul Greek (Rum) minority now living in
Athens and an important specialist on human problems in Turco-Greek relations
reminds us in his book on the subject7, one must not forget that the Greeks won
their national consciousness by fighting against the Turks in the 1820s and the
Turks won theirs by fighting against the Greeks exactly a century after;
b) The fact that there is a class problem in Western Thrace.
Economically, the minority members are incomparably weaker than the
majority (Greeks).
In conclusion, because of the mentioned reasons the Turkish
consciousness among the ethnically non-Turkish minority members in Western
Thrace is perhaps much stronger than the same consciousness among ethnic
Turks.
BULGARIA
In Bulgaria (population: about 10 million), there is a significant Muslim
minority. The Turks are about 800-900.000, the Pomaks about 300-400.000 and
the Gypsies about the same figure.
Until recently, Turkish identity among this minority was not very
strong. Perhaps the main reason behind this was the extreme difficulty to resist
assimilation policies in a rigid communist regime. The Bulgarian regime first
gradually decreased the Turkish courses, and then finally abolished them in
1971. This policy may have been welcome by some in the face of the fact that
in Bulgarian schools the minority students have had to wrestle with Bulgarian
and Russian in Cyrillic and with English, French and Turkish in Latin alphabet,
also the Arabic if the student attended private religious classes as well. These
students soon began answering their parents in Bulgarian. Some mixed
marriages occurred. In the meanwhile, the regime identified the Turkish
minority first as "Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin", then as "Bulgarian
Turks," and finally as "Bulgarian Muslims" in the period 1982-84.
However, a policy that President Jivkov declared late 1984 ended this
slow assimilation process. Jivkov, probably frightened by the high birth rate of
the Turkish population, had started the unbelievable "name changing campaign"
during which both the first and the last names of the minority were forcible
7 Tencere Dibin Kara (Nobody is sinless), Istanbul, Amaç Publishing House, 1989, p.
21
replaced by Bulgarian ones. This policy that only ended with the fall of Jivkov
(and of the regime) in late 1989 forced the Turks to initiate organized resistance
within the framework of "National Liberation Movement of Turks of Bulgaria"
during the summer of 19858. This organization started violent resistance,
exploding bombs here and there. During mass demonstrations in May 1989,
some Turks were shot dead by security forces (2 in Varna, 2 in Rasgrad, 5 in
Sumnu). After 2500 minority intellectuals were expelled in June 1989, the
government began sending convoys of people to Turkey.
How did this passive minority oppose such an unexpected resistance?
First, the role of dialectics strikes one's attention. The minority, who had not
reacted when he had to pay 20 levas (a very heavy fine) per Turkish word
because he feared the regime before 1985, exploded when this policy of
assimilation went so far as to change the names of people.
However, this explanation is insufficient. The underlining reason might
be the fact that their names (Ali, Osman, Ömer, etc.) were at the same time
Islamic names while the new names given to them were Orthodox Christian
names. The fact that this crazy campaign went so far as to change the names on
the tomb stones no doubt intensified the religious reaction. That is to say, when
we speak of ethnic conflict in Bulgaria, what we witness is a religious conflict
deep inside. This is also illustrated by the fact that, after the fall of Jivkov on 10
November 1989, everybody began sending their children to the Coranic courses
and started ordering religious books from Turkey. The first publication to arrive
from this country was the "Calendar of Prayer Times Abroad" published by the
Turkish Directory of Religious Affairs.
Now let us consider the Pomaks in Bulgaria. The Turkish identity
among them is much weaker when compared with the Pomaks in Greece. It is
significant that being called "Pomak" is not an insult here. Some of the Pomaks
in Bulgaria do not identify themselves as Turks. A great number of them can't
tell who they are and some identify themselves as "Bulgarian Muslims".
One reason for this difference is probably the fact that Pomak language
is a dialect of the Bulgarian. However, since Pomaks are devout Muslims, the
fact that the Muslim religious institution in Bulgaria (Basmüftülük) lost most of
8 The Rights and Liberties Party that holds a key position in the Bulgarian Parliament
because of the precarious numeric balance, is an extension of this organization. This
party, far from being nationalistic, pursues a policy of large front and claims to
represent not only Turks but all the minorities and even Bulgarians as well. Indeed, the
party is represented by 24 deputies in the parliament, of which 3 are Pomaks and 4
Bulgarians. The leaders of the party that was founded on March 1990 gathered an
extraordinary congress whereby they "eliminated nationalist elements who wanted to
deploy Turkish flag".
its power over the Muslim community during the communist regime is also
very important indeed.
The name changing campaign affected Pomaks also. It is even reported
that the first reaction to the campaign came from the Pomak youth. In an
interview, Mr. Kazim Memis, consultant to the Bulgarian Ministry of Education
for Turkish courses, told me that the Pomaks struggled very much during the
last two years for learning Turkish. They thought that two hours per week of
Turkish was insufficient and protested against it. They asked for private Turkish
courses and threatened the authorities of the Rights and Liberties Party, the
"Party of the Turks" that holds to-date a key position in Parliament, saying: "If
you don't solve this question, we will not vote for you!" A common saying
among the Pomaks is: "Bulgarians took our language, but we didn't give our
religion". I think this saying sums up the situation.
The Basmüftülük will probably get stronger under the new regime and
gain more power over the minority. Furthermore, there are more than 300 real
estates that will return to the Muslim religious foundations as a result of re-
privatizations and this should make the Basmüftülük stronger. At the end of
1992, this religious institution didn't even have a vehicle of its own and the
deputy Basmüftü told me : "If even we had one, we could not pay for the fuel".
In this process, not only official Islam, but also heterodox Islam might
get stronger in the short run for the following reasons :
1. Communism as an ideology cohesion is dead, and the masses will go
back to their previous ideology of cohesion that they had never forgotten
anyway. This process of the "Revenge of the God" is already what all the
Balkans experience today.
2. An upsurge of Orthodox religion among Bulgarians will hasten the
same process among Bulgarian Muslims.
3. The development of capitalism will inevitably disturb the income
distribution and will hit the lower middle class. The rising inflation will worsen
the situation and push the impoverished masses towards the religion.
MACEDONIA
The situation in Macedonia is completely different concerning the
relationship between Turkish and Muslim identities.
The population of Macedonia is 2.240.000. According to 1991 official
figures, 1.315.000 are Orthodox Macedonians, and the Muslims are composed
of 430.000 Albanians, 98.000 Turks and 35.000 Gypsies five to ten thousand of
which can speak Turkish and identify themselves as Turkish. However, the third
largest Muslim minority is not the Gypsy community but the Torbesh
population, a devout Muslim community registered as Macedonian because
their mother tongue is the Macedonian.
The estimated figure of the Torbesh population is between 35.000 and
100.000. According to one opinion, "Torbesh" is the name given to Macedonian
Pomaks, according to another opinion it's the name given to the Slavic Muslims
in Macedonia, and according to a third thesis the Torbesh are the descendants of
Turks who came to the region before the Ottoman period. Before studying this
little known people, I want first to discuss the relationship between national
identities and Islam in Macedonia.
As will be seen from the population figures given above, the most
important minority in this Balkan country are not the Turks as is the case in
Greece and Bulgaria, but the Albanians. This people who boycotted the
population census in 1991 and who claim to be about 700.000 held in
Macedonia a position similar to the Turks in Bulgaria and especially in Greece :
They are identified with Islam. Indeed, Turks live under the shadow of
Albanians who proclaimed in the last election campaign that Turks were the
common enemy of both Albanians and Macedonians. Turks are subject to
assimilation by the Albanians and this threat is particularly valid for those who
intermarry with the Albanians.
"I can kill ten Turks for one Macedonian, because it is the Ottomans
who left us underdeveloped!" What is the idea behind this Albanian saying
quoted by the Macedonian Turks from the high school memories of the 1960s?
According to Macedonian Turks, this saying reveals the desire to
completely eliminate the Ottoman identity in order to develop the Albanian
identity among the Albanians. This explanation seems to be the correct one,
because in this country Muslim and Ottoman identities are identical among the
middle aged Albanians, at least. For instance, many Albanians still use the
following phrase to take an oath : "I swear by the faith of my Turkish
religion..."
Macedonian Turks, who have always experienced a lively national
culture and always maintained a close cultural relationship with Turkey, are
highly aware of this situation, as witnessed in an article by Mr. Sabit Yusuf
published immediately before the census of 1991 : "We are Turkish, we are
Muslim. All is well. However, in official occasions like this, one should not mix
religious matters to our national identity. Because, our national identity is
above everything. Individuals from other peoples say : 'Well, I am a Muslim but
first of all my identity is this or that'. I think we should defend the same
position. (...) One thing is obvious. Every man determines his own fate. Nothing
can change this, neither the religious relations, nor the marriage relations"9.
Albanians also dominate the Macedonian Islamic Union, the religious
organization of Macedonian Muslims. The Assembly of the organization
9 Birlik (newspaper in Turkish published three times a week in Skopie), 23 March
1991.
comprises 26 Albanians, 4 Turks, 3 Torbesh and 1 Gypsy. The Meshihat, the
executive body of the organization is composed of 12 Albanians, 2 Torbesh,
and 1 Turk.
Before I conclude the discussion regarding the relationship between
Albanian consciousness and Islam and go onto the case of the Torbesh, I
should also note that Orthodox Albanians in former Yugoslavia are assimilated
by the Macedonians, Catholic Albanians by the Croats and that only Muslim
Albanians are nationalists.
The Torbesh are devout Muslims distinguished by their remarkable
adaptation capability, just like the Pomaks in Greece and Bulgaria. However,
this is not a "capability of being assimilated" by anyone. At present time, the
Macedonian state does its best to prevent them from joining the ranks of the
Albanians or the Turks. For instance, in the post-communist era where
thousands of workers are being dismissed because of the economic crisis, the
Macedonian authorities require from the Torbesh who re-apply for employment
a signed document stating that their identity is Muslim and nothing else.
Moreover, the state has established an organization under the name of "The
Culture and Science Center of Macedonian Muslims". The motto of the Center
is reminiscent of the Greek policy concerning the Pomaks: "Torbesh are local
people, i.e., Macedonians; but the Ottomans converted them forcefully". The
Center has only 50 members. Its chairman, Mr. Niyazi Limanovski cannot go
out without police protection since the Torbesh beat him once for being a
traitor.
Therefore, one should interpret this "capability of being assimilated" as
a propensity to be assimilated by the largest Muslim community. It is claimed
that the Torbesh identified themselves without exception as Turkish until the
time the Ottomans left the region as a result of the First Balkan War in 1912.
Some of this people now identify themselves as Muslims only, while some
describe themselves more and more as Albanians, and some say they are Turks.
I interviewed some important members of this last group in Kitchevo
(Turkish name : Kircaova). It is noteworthy that although they cannot speak
Turkish, they claim that their ancestors came from Konya before the Ottoman
period. Their mother tongue is Macedonian. I asked them why they cannot
speak Turkish if they are Turks. They replied : "Our schools were closed down
after the Ottomans withdrew, and 600 of us who resisted this policy were killed.
Therefore, we began to speak Macedonian to avoid oppression and to find
employment."
However, this people are struggling hard to learn Turkish. Through the
Kitchevo branch of the Turkish Democratic Party (TDP), the political
organization of the Turks in Macedonia10, they demanded that the education
10 TDP was formed in 1990 and found ready support among the Torbesh. At the first
gathering in Kitchevo it is reported that the congress hall that seats 600 was full.
The language of their children be Turkish instead of Macedonian. The authorities
suggested three hours a week of elective Turkish course and reportedly asked
them why they want the courses to be in Turkish since they cannot speak that
language. The Torbesh replied : "The children of the Macedonians who
emigrated to Australia cannot speak Macedonian either, but nevertheless they
go to a Macedonian school!"
The Torbesh that I interviewed told me that if the authorities don't open
Turkish classes they will start a hunger strike. After my return to Turkey, they
actually did start one. I saw a petition form signed by 262 parents:
"I, undersigned, who live at (the address), voluntarily declare that I
demand my child (the name) to learn Turkish together with classes in
Macedonian."
I asked them the following question : "If you had the choice, which
would you prefer to get from Turkey, an imam who would teach you the
religion or a teacher to teach you Turkish?". They said they would want both.
Upon my insistence, they said their first preference would be a teacher : "Our
children should be educated. There are lots of religious books, we can learn it
by ourselves but we cannot learn Turkish by ourselves."
KOSOVO
There are only 12.000 Turks in Kosovo while 90% of the population are
Albanian. The reciprocal position of the Turks and the Albanians vis-à-vis the
Islam in Macedonia is even more accentuated here :
1. The Albanian manipulation of Islam to assimilate the Turks naturally
has a much bigger dimension in Kosovo.
The Family Name Law of 1946 is a turning point in this regard. At this
period, annexation of Albania to Yugoslavia was still on the agenda, so the state
authorities considered Turks as Albanians. National identity was not much
developed among Turks yet. Albanians were in control of the situation in the
area. In such an atmosphere, the Turkish family names that took a Serbian
suffix before (-ievitch), begun to take an Albanian suffix (-i) after the
promulgation of the law.
In ex-Yugoslavia, the Turkish identity was recognized after the
possibility of annexation of Albania vanished. However, as the autonomy of
Kosovo increased after 1974, the position of the Albanians became stronger and
opening speech by Mr. Avni Engüllü, then chairman of the party, was translated into
Macedonian so that the Torbesh could understand. This translation was explained as "a
sign of respect for any Macedonians who might happen to be present at the congress",
as if the Torbesh could understand Turkish.
"soft" assimilation of the Turks by the Albanians gained momentum. The
Albanians used the present situation to suggest that the Turks should side with
the Albanians : "You should send your child to an Albanian school; there is no
university in Turkish but in Albanian there is. He can find employment more
easily." An Islamic discourse was profusely used to create a "We" image : "We
are all Muslim brothers, there is no need for separatism, for Turkish language",
"When we are dead, the imam will bury us, and the infidel will be buried by the
priest", or "The infidel will cut up you and me with the same knife". On the
other hand, the Albanians were careful to identify the "They" image not with
the "Serb" but with the "Infidel". Yet, at the time they said all this, i.e., before
1989, Albanians were anything but devout Muslims.
2. Not only the dimension of the assimilation increased but its very
nature also tended to change. Together with the rise of the Albanian
consciousness, violent actions replaced the soft assimilation.
Firstly, the use of violence began in the field of education. When
Albanians boycotted the schools and that the Turkish Democratic Union (TDU),
the political organization of the Turks in Kosovo, refused to cooperate, the
Turkish students were beaten by their Albanian friends, as witnessed on
Seventeen November and Ortakol schools in Prizren on 9 September 1991.
When these students began to carry their books in plastic bags so that they
could pretend not going to school, Albanian students started calling them
"Milosh", a nickname for Milosevitch, the Serbian leader. A leader of the Turks
in Kosovo, Mr. Cemal Krüezi11, told me that when he was a TDU candidate for
the parliament, the parents of his daughter's school friends said to their children:
"Don't play with Bahriye, her father became an infidel!" Again, the same theme
: Islam.
Secondly, Albanians boycotted the 1991 census and used force against
those who didn't. Some twenty Turkish census officials were intimidated and
quit their jobs. TDU tried hard to find new ones.
The Albanianized Turks are generally people who "have something to
lose" like doctors, lawyers and civil servants. It is reported that they don't send
their children to Turkish classes, that they speak Albanian at home and prefer to
lose their Turkish identity in order not to loose their jobs. Particularly, those are
the Turks having marriage relationship with the Albanians.
As for the Torbesh in Kosovo, they are clearly far from considering
themselves as Turks. They register "Muslim" in population census and they feel
11 This family name which doesn't sound a bit Turkish is given by the Albanians. This
person introduces himself as Krüezi-Tunaligil; this last name being a typical Turkish
last name.
close to the Bosnians. One could well expect that in the near future they will
increasingly identify themselves as Albanians.
CONCLUSION
1. As I already pointed out, the national identity among the Turkish
minorities in the Balkans finds its greatest support in Islam, as illustrated by this
Macedonian proverb : "The last one to emigrate is the Imam." This is so
because the religion of the majority is different. Of course, in this peninsula that
underwent the influence of the Ottoman Millet system the national identities of
the majorities are supported by their religious identity; however, because of the
presence of oppression, the main factor in the definition of the concept
"minority", this situation is especially true for the Balkan minorities.
In Greece and Bulgaria where the Turks are the main ethnic element of
the Muslim minority, they use Islam to naturally assimilate and Turkify the
other Muslims.
2. In Macedonia and especially Kosovo where the Turks are not the
largest Muslim minority, Islam works for the dominant minority, Albanians this
time. In these two cases, Albanians manipulate Islam and sometimes use force
to assimilate the Turks and the Torbesh.
